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Abstract 
This article is an imagined dialogue between Weber and Simmel which 
makes a modest use of some of the resources of theatrical play in order to 
provide an overall portrait of both thinkers and to bring their thought to 
bear on our present. The dialogue consists of three acts focused on three 
central problematics in as many critical moments in Weber and Simmel’s 
lives: Act I takes place during the preparations for the first conference of 
the German Sociological Association and thus deals with the constitution 
of sociology as a socio-cultural science. Act II takes place amid the First 
World War and its theme is evidently politics. Finally, Act III, where our 
two characters correspond instead of maintaining a face-to-face dialogue, 
is situated towards the end of the war and focuses on the attitude to life and 
indeed to death, as Simmel’s tragic yet admirable death takes place then. A 
brief introduction explains how we tried to use the possibilities of the 
dialogical form to expound Weber’s and Simmel’s thought, to compel 
them to confront their own blind spots and ‘unthoughts’, as well as to 
explore new ways of teaching the classics and transmitting their thought. 
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Introduction 
This is an imagined dialogue between Weber and Simmel in which 
we seek to honour the remit of the Edinburgh conference for which 
the dialogue was prepared and where it was read-performed by the 
authors for the first time (Frade as Weber, Pyyhtinen as Simmel), 
namely, not only to bring Weber’s and Simmel’s thought to life, 
but to bring that thought to bear on our present. To achieve this, we 
were clear that there were at least three conditions, both negative 
and positive, we had to try and meet: 
First, the dialogue had to be truly addressed to all, and thus to 
anyone, and not specifically to scholars; above all, it had to avoid 
scholasticism. 
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Second, we had to stay away from a merely historical dialogue 
which would wallow in and thus somehow endorse the canonical 
figures of Weber and Simmel as these have been established for 
nearly one century now by a very prolific scholarship, and try 
instead to bring their thought to life, a task that required to enliven 
their own relation by divesting it of the social conventions which, 
particularly on Weber’s side, prevented it from becoming a more 
fluid and fruitful exchange. In doing this, we deliberately contradict 
the historical record, which shows that Simmel was not among the 
very tiny circle of people whom Weber addressed by their first 
names. However, we must emphasize that the relation they 
maintain in the dialogue, where they address each other in a 
familiar manner as friends, is real – and the real is a category not to 
be confused with reality. It is that real, a relation free from 
formalities and conventionalisms, what enabled us to unfold and 
harness the possibilities of the theatrical form for developing a 
dialogical dynamics traversed by antagonisms from beginning to 
end. Through such antagonistic dialectic, we sought to compel our 
Weber and Simmel characters to confront not only what somehow 
goes without saying: their opposite stances. But beyond that, we 
especially wanted to have them face up to their own blind spots and 
‘unthoughts’. 
 
Third, and finally, there is the fundamental question concerning the 
teaching of the classics and the transmission of their thought. While 
this aspect is already fully implicated in the aforementioned two 
conditions, we would like to highlight here that nodal point where 
the educational and the theatrical meet, namely, play. Two things 
were to be avoided as much as possible at this level: didacticism 
and entertainment – didacticism because it implies a managerial 
conception and practice of education as extrinsic to the matter at 
hand which technifies problems and ruins thought and the 
possibility of its transmission; entertainment because, as the 
ideological practice of pleasing opinions and the present state of 
things, it deactivates thought and stifles the possibility that the 
dialogical form brings about a subjective shift in the reader-
spectator. Thus, if education is inherent to the dialogue itself, it 
comes about as an effect of the play – assuming it is played in all 
seriousness, as children do. 
 
As regards the questions and problematics addressed, our choice 
was determined by our intention to provide an overall conceptual 
portrait of both thinkers and play out the antagonisms of their 
thought through an imagined, but real, dialogue. Thus, we decided 
to focus on three central problematics in as many critical moments 
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in Weber and Simmel’s lives: Act I takes place during the 
preparations for the first conference of the German Sociological 
Association and thus deals with the constitution of sociology as a 
socio-cultural science. Act II takes place amid World War 1 and its 
theme is evidently politics. Finally, Act III, where our two 
characters correspond instead of maintaining a face-to-face 
dialogue, is situated towards the end of the war and focuses on the 
attitude to life and indeed to death, as Simmel’s tragic yet 
admirable death occurs at the end of the dialogue. 
Dialogue 
ACT I: Spring 1910, preparations for the first conference of the 
German Sociological Association (Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Soziologie; DGS), which will be finally held on 19/22 October 
1910, in Frankfurt. Simmel’s apartment in Berlin. Topic: Nature of 
sociological work as both theory and practice. 
Weber:  What astonishes me, Dr Simmel, is that ... we are 
so different animals. Indeed so opposite and 
antagonistic are our ultimate positions that ... it is 
as if we were from different species. And yet, ... 
yet we are able to connect and to communicate 
pretty much ... I may object to your peculiar 
‘style’ of doing sociological work, to a way of 
reasoning that to me is a way of reasoning ‘by 
analogy’ ... but you do all this so brilliantly, ... 
Simmel:  Max, please: Georg, not Simmel – but Georg! For 
reasons that have escaped me my work has found 
many fierce adversaries in Germany, enemies, 
even – as we both know all too well from the 
disappointing result of my appointment at 
Heidelberg. 
Weber:  I find that deeply regrettable myself, too. And 
I’m sorry that all my own efforts to secure you a 
position were in vain. 
Simmel:  Please be assured that I appreciate your help and 
support. Nevertheless, it gives me little comfort 
to realize that even the ones to whom my 
appointment would have been scandalous, 
appreciate the ‘great attraction’ that I would 
have been for the university; they just don’t love 
me there. In certain circles there prevails the idea 
that I’m an ‘exclusively critical, even destructive 
spirit’, and these foolish detractors also claim that 
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my thinking only leads to negation. What 
nonsense! In my writings just as much in my 
teaching, ... I always tend toward the positive, 
ultimately toward gaining a deeper understanding 
of the totality of the world. That should be clear 
to anyone who is the least familiar with my work. 
And, my use of analogies that you lamented for 
... 
Weber:  ... yes, Georg, but ... 
Simmel:  ... but for me, through analogies we are able to 
make surprising links between seemingly 
unconnected and distinct things. I see analogies 
as means of grasping the unfamiliar in terms of 
the familiar. They allow us to comprehend what 
we do not know by relating it to what we already 
know. 
Weber:  But you use them to illustrate utterly 
heterogeneous matters, and I cannot accept that. 
Such whims of mind, no matter how stimulating, 
are not much of a methodology! 
Simmel:  Heterogeneity is bad only as long as you are 
trying to build a unified system. To me, the 
further the subject matters lie from each other, 
the more extensive is our glimpse of the totality. 
To propose an analogy between, say, sociability 
and art – I think I have mentioned you that I’m 
planning on discussing sociability in my opening 
address to our conference, right? – is to highlight 
their similarity, to draw attention to what they 
have in common despite their differences. 
Analogies are about seeing similarity in 
difference. 
What is more, let me note that by using analogies 
I do not only try to make graspable something 
new or less familiar by comparing it to the more 
familiar, but I am at the same time trying to 
discover something new in the familiar as well, I 
mean see the familiar in a new light. Thanks to 
the relation of analogy established, we are able to 
see both of the related terms from a new 
perspective. 
Weber:  Yes, Georg, I understand. But look: yours is a 
mode of perception and a manner of expression 
which are unique. It is truly brilliant what you do, 
and your phenomenological capture of modern 
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man’s experience is extremely sensitive and 
provides a wealth of stimulation. But this is 
something inherent in your personality, 
something nobody can imitate. And this is the 
problem, Georg; I am concerned with the 
question of transmission or transmissibility, with 
education if you wish. Transmission requires 
method, ultimately an impersonal method, which 
is what makes knowledge independent of the 
personality of the thinker, and thus potentially 
transmissible. Without this sense of method in the 
broad sense we cannot possibly establish a new 
discipline or a new science. You have mentioned 
our approaching conference in October, and here 
the main problem is how to develop the new 
socio-cultural science we both consider sociology 
to be. 
Simmel:  You are right, Max, my own sociology is of a 
very particular kind. And it’s true that it has no 
other exponents in Germany other than myself, 
and also in that sense it is a mode of thinking, a 
specific form of questioning rather than a 
discipline. However, while it’s likely that I will 
remain without true disciples and followers, to 
me thinking – including my own – is never 
reducible to the thinking person (nor to her 
environment, for that matter). Rather, it has its 
roots in the layer of typical spirituality to be 
found in the thinker and their thought. The 
singular type of each thinker mediates the 
relation between the particular and the general; 
thinking turns the personal into something 
objective, and the objective into something 
personal. So, I hope that my own work, too, is 
able to stand for something typical or general that 
coincides with how others experience the world. 
Weber:  That’s well put, Georg, and very few will be able 
to claim such power of intellectual stimulation as 
I am sure you will have among the future 
generations. But now our problem is different. 
We have devoted so many efforts to our 
Sociological Association and to prepare our 
approaching first conference! I wouldn’t like all 
this to be wasted, so we need to continue to work 
this out together. And here we have the notion of 
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culture at the centre of our concerns. You 
yourself conceive of culture in terms of tensions; 
culture for you is what comes out of the 
continuous conflicts and contradictions between 
subjective life and objective form. This is what I 
find most productive in your approach (and this 
not only on account of the obvious affinities with 
my own ideas about the primacy of the question 
of tensions and conflicts). 
Simmel:  Yes, your interpretation is apt. For me culture 
involves the creation and assimilation of 
something that’s external to the human subject. 
We develop ourselves by developing objects. 
However, once created those objects tend to gain 
autonomy, a logic and lawfulness of their own. 
So in that sense, yes, it all comes down to conflict 
– that between life and form. I see their contrast 
as the innermost motive for cultural 
transformation and the basis for culture having a 
history. And, just like any cultural forms, social 
forms, too, may gain independence of the life and 
culture of subjects. 
We can see this objectification happening 
throughout the whole range of social forms, to 
some extent even in the elementary forms that 
mostly remain in the servitude of the practical 
needs of daily life, but especially in the larger 
institutionalized formations, such as family 
structures, the state, religion and in particular the 
economy. Indeed, perhaps no other form has truly 
become a world for itself to the extent that the 
economy has. It seems to operate completely 
without regard for what the subjects need and 
want. The economy now goes its necessary way, 
entirely as though men were there for its sake, but 
not it for the sake of man. So, in the economy, the 
tension and conflict between life and what is 
opposite-of-life reaches its culmination. 
All in all, for me the deepest problems of modern 
life have to do with how human subjects are able 
to maintain the independence and individuality of 
their existence against the constraining coercive 
power of autonomous, objectified forms such as 
society and its sovereign powers. So, while we 
most certainly need to discuss in our conference 
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the field of sociology and its methodological 
justification and its relation to its neighbouring 
fields, I think, Max, that we also need to address 
social and cultural phenomena in the widest 
possible sense to avoid getting stuck with formal 
and scholastic disputes. 
Weber:  Precisely. It is on that basis that I think we have 
to try and define a form of enquiry adequate to 
the understanding of sociology as socio-cultural 
science, aimed at studying the external, shaping 
effects of objective forms, above all of that most 
fateful force of our modern life, and then look at 
their significance for subjective and cultural life. 
Simmel:  I see. What I find at the core of cultural processes 
today is a growing separation, in truth a gap 
between objective culture and subjective culture. 
And in this context it seems to me to be of utmost 
importance to enquire about how individuality 
can persist and flourish in the face of the 
overwhelmingly ‘external culture and technique 
of life’, or the ‘social-technological mechanism’. 
Weber:  That’s our fate, confronting those growing gaps 
while living within the ‘social-technological 
mechanism’ or what I call ‘the steel-hard shell’. 
The subjective capacity to wage this struggle, 
which preoccupies me deeply, is at the core of 
what I once called the ‘transcendental 
presupposition of every science of culture’ and 
should also be a major research aim of the kind of 
sociology we want to foster (you know, ‘man as a 
cultural being able to take a stance toward the 
world and to lend it meaning’); this is not simply 
a question of acting in relation to values, which is 
trivial, let alone, as some have claimed, of having 
preferences ... ‘having preferences!’ [W repeats 
disdainfully], those are the last men! [big 
laughter] – perhaps they would wish to establish 
a socio-cultural science of happiness. Those of 
whom all that can be said is that they have 
preferences are men whose life simply slips by, 
exposed to the pushing and pulling forces of the 
world. But this has nothing to do with what I 
meant, which is a question of subjective life 
conduct, and thus of subjective capacity to lead 
an inwardly conducted life. Of course such 
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capacity is fostered or stifled by socio-cultural 
forms and institutions, and that’s why I am 
determined to propose to our Association in the 
October meeting to begin with two major 
sociological enquiries, one on ‘associational life’ 
and another one on the cultural significance of 
the modern press. 
Simmel:  I share your view. The socio-historical relations 
most certainly create possibilities and intensities 
for the emergence and development of 
individuality: the impersonal life of the 
metropolis demands of subjects that they develop 
and stress personal uniqueness. In fact, ... I think 
that we are able to understand those aspects of 
modern life which make it ‘modern’ only by 
analysing the adaptation of individuals to social 
conditions, to objective culture and its forces that 
lie outside individual subjects. However, at the 
same time I see that it’s important to emphasize 
that the life of the individual is not exhausted by 
the socio-historical milieu. The individual self 
not only belongs to the world as a part but is also 
a self-enclosed whole, ... indeed a world in itself. 
Weber:  I don’t think I share your view of what you call 
‘qualitative individuality’, especially the way I 
know you romanticize the heroic individuality of 
your cultural idols such as Michelangelo and 
Rembrandt. So also in the approaching 
conference I intend to kindle some controversy 
and discord in this regard in relation to you, 
Georg. But even more generally, creating 
controversy and disagreement is always useful to 
clarify problems and make our positions manifest 
– and then, once this is clarified, we can decide 
whether to continue the dispute among ourselves 
or to displace it toward other fronts. A discipline 
which is alive is surely driven by some 
substantive controversies on the serious 
problems. 
Simmel:  I for my part feel that it will serve the aims of our 
conference the best if we delineate sociology in a 
very broad sense, along the lines how we 
specified it in the invitation to the Sociological 
Association that we sent out to colleagues. We 
should not let disputes, tensions and quarrels 
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within the discipline take hold of us, for that 
might hamper our goal to secure sociology a 
place in the family of sciences – mind you, ... to 
this day there is not a single chair in sociology in 
the whole of Germany! But of course, as you 
very well know, Max, personally I take 
controversies as very productive for thought. 
Instead of making a final choice between 
opposing viewpoints or adopting a half-hearted 
mediation, I always think that we need to proceed 
through infinite reciprocity, that is, base our 
analysis on a shifting balance between the poles 
of the contrast. 
[END OF ACT I] 
 
 
ACT II: Winter 1917–1918, amid the war and the fading 
enthusiasm for it. Weber had been elected to the Workers’ and 
Soldiers’ Council of Heidelberg, and the bourgeois world was 
under the shock of October 1917 and its intense reverberations in 
Germany before the Spartacist revolution broke out. The dialogue 
takes place during Simmel’s imagined visit to Weber’s house in 
Heidelberg (famous for its Sunday afternoon intellectual 
gatherings) from his retreat in the Black Forest, where he was 
enjoying the joys of crispy mountain air and quiet existence. Topic: 
politics (war, nationalism, imperialism, masses, revolution). 
Weber:  We cannot deny that we both happily shared the 
national enthusiasm that took the country by 
storm in the summer of 1914. It is now more than 
three years ago. We were fascinated and deeply 
affected, yes ... we experienced joy, that preserve 
of rare collective moments and of the highest 
intellectual achievements. Indeed we were carried 
away by the massive willingness we saw and felt 
(at least I did) to sacrifice one’s life. Perhaps 
things now look different [W pauses for a 
moment, reflectively]: the war that then seemed 
‘great and wonderful’ now is senseless, 
transformed as it is in the everyday. 
Simmel:  My dear Max, we were certainly carried away. I 
remember well how I thought that the war would 
bring about an altogether new time, one that 
broke with prevailing cynicism and did away 
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with the aestheticisation of existence and with 
mammonism. This did happen then, I believe. ... 
But I also believed that the war, ... that the 
welcoming of war in that mood of joy you 
mentioned amounted to a transcending of 
individual and class interests – a very mistaken 
judgement in retrospect. 
Weber:  Mistaken? Well, not everything, Georg, surely 
not for me. I felt and still feel with the same 
conviction that that sense of national unity, that 
patriotic enthusiasm and the willingness to go to 
the very end and risk one’s life for the fatherland 
has permanent value – it makes sense to me, 
Georg, as something meaningful and lasting ... to 
the point (I hadn’t told this to you before, so I 
‘confess’ now) that I went back to my 
Intermediate Reflection ... 
Simmel:  Oh, so you went back to what is without doubt 
one of your greatest intellectual achievements? 
To change something! 
Weber:  Yes, I went back to sharpen the idea about what a 
meaningful death could be for us, members of 
modern humankind, and to make clear that only 
‘perishing in the calling’, if anything, can make 
death meaningful for us. This total devotion to 
the calling, assuming we have one, my dear 
Georg, rather than (as you would have it) an 
endless quest for a vague unity with life, which to 
me borders on the mystical escape, is what can 
have eternal value. Provided of course that we are 
committed to it on an everyday basis; and then 
we find joy in it. You see, Georg, I am proud to 
say that the joy we felt in the summer of 1914 I 
have experienced many times since – and this in 
spite of all the dreadful things that have happened 
in all these years of war, in spite of my 
restlessness and constant tension and anger at the 
incompetence of our leaders; yes in spite of all 
that, and in the midst of all that, I have found true 
moments of joy when talking to the returning 
soldiers, or welcoming wounded soldier-friends 
here in this house and listening to their rather 
different stories and views, ... and also of course 
in my frequent disputes with the revolutionary 
youth (that immature youth but beautiful and 
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admirable after all) ... Yes, all this has been 
extraordinary and a source of joy for me. So, yes, 
what we felt in 1914, I meant it and I mean it – 
till the end. 
Simmel:  Now this is you – the Max Weber whom I know. 
As for me, well, you know very well that I am 
‘politically unmusical’, as you would say. But I 
felt as if the war took hold of everything. Indeed, 
I experienced it as the ‘absolute situation’, 
irresistible and somehow beyond comprehension, 
even. You may say that I succumbed to it, but in 
truth I willingly submitted to it as a life-
transforming force. At any rate, you will be glad 
to hear that I have continued with my work, in 
which I am very absorbed now. 
Weber:  Glad but not surprised, Georg; that’s your calling 
and you’re faithful to it. 
Simmel:  Yes, this has never been in question. But the 
years I have spent in Strasbourg have had the 
effect of aging me twice or three times over what 
is normal. During the war academic activity has 
equalled zero there. Apart from few wonderful 
exceptions the faculty as a whole is, frankly, a 
half-witted bunch. Most locals remain strangers 
and mentally distant to me and Gertrud. In 
Strasbourg I often have the feeling that the inner 
excitation of pursuing my work as well as the 
monstrous tensions brought by the war find no 
counterpart in the dull and monotonous course of 
everyday life, as if one had to endure disjointed 
temporalities. So hard these war years have been 
and still are, hmmm ... this is something I cannot 
make sense of, or even fully express. But I 
suspect that you think of me as incompetent or a 
cretin in politics who has to be taken to the 
political kindergarten ... 
Weber:  Unmusical in politics, Georg – only that, you said 
it. 
Simmel:  Yes, yes. I love Germany, the German Spirit, and 
I wanted to make clear where my side was. It is 
true that I did not think, that I left unthought 
many things in that love. But I believe I am not 
the only one who carries many ‘unthoughts’ to 
his ultimate commitments, as you will say, and 
has nevertheless gone on with them, without 
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thinking such unthoughts through and yet 
indulging in the expectation or hope that 
something, something short of a miracle, may 
happen. Isn’t this the conclusion to be directly 
drawn from what you were telling me a while 
ago, after I arrived, in relation to your discussions 
in the last months with our common friend Dr 
Lukács, whom you’ve always treated not only as 
a privileged intellect but also as one of your 
favourite companions in conversation? The 
impression I got from your words – and those 
were weighty words, Max, spontaneous and 
heartfelt words, words reflecting something that 
seems to disturb you deeply – my impression was 
that you felt hard pressed to account for your 
nationalist and imperialist politics ... 
Weber:  ... You know that the questions of how we should 
imagine peace and the kind of peace that was to 
result from this war were always at the heart of 
my concerns and my public interventions – were 
and are, today even more so. This makes my 
position radically different from the blind 
imperialism of the Pan-German league and the 
military command ... 
Simmel:  ... whom I know you are publicly fighting with 
your usual brio and courage. But perhaps the 
difference between blind and well-advised 
imperialism is ultimately not as radical as you 
imply. At any rate, the question that seems to 
arise from what you said about your disputes with 
Lukács is that the way you often dismiss the 
revolution (not that you reject it personally, but 
that you dismiss it intellectually) may be 
inconsistent with your defence of nationalism or 
national imperialism. After all, nearly all your 
disqualifications of the revolutionary drive can 
equally be applied to the imperialist drive: I 
mean, you indict the revolutionary for ideological 
fanaticism, but you can be indicted for 
nationalistic fanaticism; you mock the 
romanticism of the general strike, but one can 
also deride the romanticism of the national idea; 
you dismiss revolutionary expectations, but one 
can also dismiss imperialistic expectations; and, 
finally, you argue that the revolution is often 
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attempted at the expense of the proletariat, but 
you can be told that imperialistic expansion has 
been attempted at the expense of the German 
people – after all, if one pauses for a moment to 
reflect on the many hundreds of thousands who 
have died so far ... For God’s sake, Max, is this a 
war or is it senseless butchery? 
Weber:  ... Yes, ... it has become a senseless slaughter; 
this cannot be denied. Nor can I deny to you that 
the issue you pose troubles me. But look, Georg, 
I was referring before to the moments of joy I 
have felt through these fateful years ... They all 
bear on my relation with normal people, with 
ordinary fellows, indeed it is not just a relation, it 
is about working and getting things done with the 
modest people, including the revolutionaries – to 
tell you the truth, I have been surprised to find 
that not all of them are revolutionary ‘literati’, by 
no means; most are people of genuine conviction, 
true revolutionaries, I guess. My respect and 
admiration for all these people, revolutionaries or 
not, is unconditional. 
Simmel:  But that’s the point, Max, your respect for them 
is sincere and unconditional, but on the other 
hand you decry what you often call ‘the politics 
of the street’. ... Isn’t there something unthought 
in that relationship? 
Weber:  Politics needs leaders, Georg, if there are capable 
leaders then the irrationality of the street is 
removed, or at least is kept under control, so that 
we have something like the conduct of politics. 
Simmel:  I see. That’s Max, the political animal we all 
know. But what about the revolutionary and the 
nationalist animals? 
Weber:  Well, here we enter into the battle of the gods, the 
eternal struggle between irreconcilable gods – a 
struggle that ultimately ... is undecidable, ... 
Simmel:  ... Yes, but this cannot be the end of the story, Max 
... 
Weber:  The end of the story or not, I cannot go further in 
thought, Georg, because there is no rational way 
of reconciling those terrible gods. At this point 
one has to choose, and in choosing, assume the 
consequences, for the choice is by no means the 
innocuous choice those so-called pluralist have 
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pretended. Not at all, for in choosing and being 
consequent (if one truly chooses instead of 
simply going along with adaptations and 
accommodations to all sorts of things), one serves 
a god, which inevitably means that one offends 
all others. There are no middle-ways if one truly 
chooses. Otherwise, if one only pretends to 
choose, what we have is the usual non-committal 
game of adaptations and accommodations. It is an 
‘either–or’, Georg. And I made my choice. 
Simmel:  Well, whether either–or, or all or nothing at all, I 
think I made mine too. 
[END OF ACT II] 
 
 
ACT III: Spring 1918 and September 1918, two (imagined) letters 
by Simmel and Weber to each other. Simmel, as his end is 
approaching, is almost entirely preoccupied with completing his 
Lebensanschauung and looks back at this life. Simmel and Weber 
touch again the issue of politics and reflect on philosophy and their 
stances to life. 
 
 
An imagined letter by Georg Simmel to Max Weber (Black Forest, 
21 March 1918). 
Dear friend, 
Please don’t say that all I’m sending you nowadays is signed 
postcards – that is not true, and here’s a letter to prove it! We are 
now back to the Württembergian Black Forest, in fresh, crisp air, 
surrounded by the smell of trees and by peaceful fields, enjoying 
lavish meals. The Christian opposition of flesh and spirit does not 
apply to me at all – if I lack in flesh, I also lack in spirit. This 
serenity and quietness suggests a calm, simple existence. It could 
be healing and full of hope, were it not for the violent world that 
continues to inject its toxics into one’s blood. 
I’ve also been working fervently. Recently I’ve been 
preoccupied by most difficult ethical and metaphysical studies. The 
latter I already take up in my book Rembrandt. I remember that in 
one of our discussions at your house (by the way I cherish the many 
long hours that we’ve sat at the tea table in your living room 
engaged in the art of lively conversation), I mean you once 
lamented that I saw war as life’s solution to the crisis and tragedy 
of culture. And that may indeed have been the case back then, at 
the outbreak of the war. I must admit it, like so many other 
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intellectuals I, too, was perhaps overly enthusiastic about the war 
and its possible outcomes. Now, in my Rembrandt book as well as 
in the manuscript that I am hastening to complete right now, life-
philosophy is stripped of politics. To me, life is essentially not a 
Kampfbegriff, but a metaphysical concept. To be sure, the concept 
of life is bound to remain somewhat vague and logically imprecise, 
as to succeed in defining it would be to deny life of its essence. 
Nevertheless, the notion now seems to permeate a multitude of 
spheres and is giving a more unified rhythm to their heartbeat, so to 
speak. For me, life is an emblem of movement and becoming – it 
never is; it’s always becoming. This we find also in, say, Bergson. 
However, as he considers only creativity and how life constantly 
strives for more-life, I do not find in (Bergson’s) vitalism a bridge 
that would connect flux and fixity. Life is no unbound flux without 
boundaries. On the contrary, we can encounter and know life only 
in some form, never as an absolute flow. And yet, life cannot be 
fully accommodated in form since forms funnel and dam its stream, 
and this is why life ceaselessly destroys old forms and creates new 
ones. So, from where does the striving towards more-life gain its 
impetus? you might ask, my friend – From boundaries that restrict 
life. Every current form of life presents such a boundary. Therefore, 
as I see it, we must ultimately understand life in terms of 
transgression. In life, the act of transcending boundaries and setting 
up boundaries are united: each step over a boundary also finds and 
creates a new one – life is at once more-life and more-than life. To 
me, this forms our human condition. We are boundary beings who 
have no boundaries. 
And I see that philosophy comes to embody this to the fullest. 
Philosophy is a borderline activity that could perhaps be visualized 
by the image of the door. As it marks off a limited space, the door 
is a threshold, a borderline which demarcates an ‘inside’ from the 
‘outside’. However, just as the door gives shape to our limitedness, 
the fact that it can be opened illustrates the possibility at any 
moment of stepping out of this limitation into freedom. Philosophy 
likewise not only affirms our limitedness by uncovering what our 
thinking not-knowingly assumes, but it also surpasses our limits 
and opens up new possibilities of thinking and living, possibilities 
to think and live otherwise. 
Please give my best to Marianne. 
Yours, 
Georg 
 
––––––––––– 
An imagined letter by Weber to Simmel (Vienna, early April 1918). 
Dear friend, 
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Many thanks for your letter – you’re right, no signed postcard this 
time. You refer to politics, if only somehow negatively, as you let 
me know that you have stripped your life-philosophy of a political 
mission – but I wonder, Georg, whether it ever had one! What I see 
as important is your explicit determination to treat life as a 
metaphysical concept and not as Kampfbegriff. In taking this path 
you know that there is no way back; this definitely distances you 
from Nietzsche, but it gets you closer, it seems to me, to your inner 
being and is much more attuned to your longing. I already can see 
this path being developed quite consistently, and I look forward to 
seeing your manuscript published soon. 
As for me, I am aloof from politics. Being in Vienna helps me 
immensely to gain distance. Because, if I were home, I would have 
to leap into the fray, which I will have to do one day anyway, 
perhaps sooner than I expect, but for this I need to regain that 
distance – otherwise one gets easily trapped in this madhouse that 
Berlin has become. 
You refer to our last conversation in Heidelberg – a memorable 
one, Georg, I cannot but concur with you – about the question of 
war. I think our stands are radically different, Georg, and they will 
remain so. You are bound, as practically all life-philosophies are, to 
a metaphysical monism that prevents you from making a real 
choice, or rather for which choice is simply out of the question. The 
war as an ‘absolute situation’ is the form that monism took for you 
when the war began; before this you were as unconcerned with 
politics as one can possibly be, and then you were taken over and 
truly overwhelmed by the war. In this situation there can be no 
choice, only successive forms of monism – or, in current 
philosophical parlance, different figures of the One. 
With my warmest regards to Gertrud and to you 
Max 
 
 
 
–––––––––––– 
A (partly imagined) letter by Georg Simmel to Max and Marianne 
Weber. 
Strasbourg, 15 September 1918, dictated to Gertrud Simmel. 
Dear Max Weber, dear Mrs. Marianne! 
I thank you for your kind words and wishes. However, they cannot 
come true. I am a mortally ill man – I have liver cancer, and the 
doctors have given me only a couple of weeks to live. At any rate it 
would show extraordinary cruelty of God if this agony still lasted 
for months. So, these greetings need not be our last, but I count on 
the fact that they are, since my bodily and spiritual strength are 
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exhausted. But I would like my friends to know that I do not feel 
my life being thus prematurely disrupted; I depart with the feeling 
that this is just right, just as it should be. Overall, death is not a 
violent interruption of life that would befall it as if from outside, 
but life needs, from itself, death as its opposite, as its other. And 
my life is complete now. I have delivered the manuscript of my last 
and final book Lebensanschauung; a book that is my philosophical 
testament, my deepest and most mature book, and very close to my 
heart. It will hopefully come out soon. The world has given me and 
I have given back to the world as much as I have been able to give. 
When it comes to my work, no further addition could have brought 
anything more to it substantially, and thus I am only lucky to avoid 
the slow decay of old age – I leave at the right moment without 
melancholy or resignation. Even in my present miserable state I 
feel I’m God’s favourite, and despite all the neglect, sorrow and 
hardship I am deeply grateful that I’ve been able to live my life the 
way I have and that this is how it will finally come to its end. 
Please think of me as someone who said goodbye with his head up. 
And be warmly thanked for all the friendship and love that you 
have given me. As long as I breathe I will regard you two as a great 
gift to my life and as long as I live I will also respond to you. 
Yours, 
Georg Simmel 
 
________________ 
An imagined, never sent farewell letter by Weber to Simmel (early 
October 1918). 
My dearest friend, 
Your last letter has touched me profoundly. To see you facing death 
in such a serene and peaceful manner, and yet with such bravery 
and courage ... has struck my deepest chords. And now that I’ve 
just learnt that you have departed, that you are gone with such 
greatness of mind and soul, with your head up and your heart 
grateful, ... What can I do, since I am almost speechless and can 
hardly utter words that would seem appropriate? But I have to, 
because your exceptional way of dying testifies to your 
extraordinary way of living – how right the stoics were! But not 
only the stoics, whose philosophy your admirable death brings back 
to life; the ancient wisdom about a beautiful death is also awakened 
in a renewed form from its mythical past. 
In truth your whole thought and your very life, my dearest 
Georg, are not strange to any momentous encounter between life 
and thought, connected as they are in multifarious ways to the 
major philosophical currents, ancient and modern, to the grand 
mystical and religious traditions that our world has seen, and 
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certainly to the future. Your philosophy seems to me particularly 
attuned to assist the future strivings of philosophical life to find the 
beat of its pulse, and I have no doubts that it will be a major source 
of inspiration and a constant stimulation for generations to come. 
Here things are getting worse by the day: the nation is definitely 
collapsing and communism has become a growing presence that 
may explode at any moment. The only possible source of hope, if 
there can be any at all, is the youth, the revolutionary and pacifist 
youth. Even if they are immature and often intoxicated with the 
romanticism of revolution, they are the only ones inwardly alive, 
while all I can see among the decent elders with whom I talk 
regularly is calculations and irresolution. I still count on persuading 
these young people, or enough of them, toward a fearless but not 
foolish course of action, as some form of revolution seems 
practically inevitable now, but I fear a hard age of reaction. You 
would laugh at this, Georg, but I often feel like an old 
Mephistophelian devil among them. As it is in the nature of youth 
not to have been able to regularly confront their desire with the 
world in the battle of life, I try to somehow provide that testing 
ground for them. I try to test the inner weight of their conviction 
and to see whether they are inwardly a match for the actions 
required and for the everyday – the everyday, indeed, after all the 
mightiest power. I am restless and desperate, and cannot help 
asking myself: will they be broken when the world, their world, 
falls apart, or will they be able to persevere in their desire and say, 
‘nevertheless, in spite of everything’ ... 
My dearest Georg, I cannot say goodbye to you. What I want to say 
is, 
Forever yours in companionship and friendship 
Max 
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